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Abstract— In wireless sensor networks, sensors should have
some mechanisms to learn their locations since sensed data with-
out associated location information may be meaningless. While
many sensor localization algorithms have been proposed, security
issuesin sensor localization are usuallynot addressedin their orig-
inal design. Secure sensor localization is very challenging due to
limited computation and energy resources in sensors. It is highly
desirable that a localization scheme is robust and is able to de-
tect malicious attacks without using complex cryptographic oper-
ations. In this paper, we present and analyze detection methods
purely based on geometric constraints in sensor networks. Our
detection methods can protect the localization algorithm from ma-
licious attacks by detecting and eliminating the negative impact of
fake information.
Keywords—Reliability, Range-Free Localization, Wireless Sen-
sor Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advance of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems
(MEMS), it becomes feasible to build a sensory node that
is within the size of several cube millimeters and integrates
sensors, processors, storage, and wireless transceivers [22].
Throughshort-rangewirelesscommunication,sensornodescan
form a multi-hop wireless sensor network with reasonable cov-
erage to coordinate their behaviors, process sensed data, and
achieve their missions in a distributed fashion. Wireless sen-
sor networks have already found many applications, includ-
ing civil infrastructure monitoring, forest ﬁre detection, smart
home, etc. In all these applications, it is important to know
where the sensed data originate, i.e., the location information
about sensor nodes is also needed. However, external position-
ing mechanisms such as those by GPS or manual conﬁguration
may not be available to all sensor nodes in all application sce-
narios due to cost concerns and technical reasons. As such,
sensor localization has attracted much attention and many sen-
sor localization algorithms have been proposed in recent years.
In general, sensor localization schemes can be categorized
into two groups: range-based and range-free. By range, we
mean the quantitative, usually absolute distance. Range-based
This research was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council of Canada.
methods require absolute point-to-point distance or angle esti-
mation, and assume that the absolute distance between a sender
and a receiver can be estimated through the received signal
strength or the time-of-ﬂight of the communicationsignal from
the sender to the receiver, while range-free methods do not
need such informationat all. Range estimation usually requires
extra hardware and coordination, and thus the system cost
of range-based localization schemes is normally higher [20],
whichmakesrange-freelocationa moreappealingapproach. In
this paper we mainly focus on range-free localization, but the
principles of detecting misbehaving nodes are also applicable
to range-based localization methods.
The importance of location information also raises the con-
cern for localization schemes on the validity of such informa-
tion in the presence of faulty nodes and/or malicious attacks.
Generally, there are two approaches to information security:
protection and detection. Protection-based methods often rely
on cryptographic operations to encrypt/decrypt messages for
the prevention of malicious attacks, and the security strength
is usually high for a correctly implemented cryptographic sys-
tem. However, the system cost of such schemes is also high,
since the computation of cryptographic operations is normally
intensive and the key management is not a trivial task. In con-
trast, detection-basedmethodspassivelydetectanomaliesinthe
system and raise alarms only when abnormal behaviors are ob-
served. The overhead of detection-based systems is usually
lower than that of protection-based ones, but false alarms in
detection-based systems should be carefully controlled and the
detection mechanisms should not interrupt or slow down the
normal operations of the systems.
In this paper, we adopt a detection-based approach to im-
prove the robustness of a range-free localization scheme for
wireless sensor networks. We employ such a strategy to main-
tain a low system cost andensure an acceptableoverhead. First,
the range-free localization scheme only requires anchor nodes
that know their location to piggyback localization information
in beacon messages, and sensor nodes derive their location by
just listening to these messages, i.e., no extra hardware or com-
municationmessages are necessary. Second, bothanchornodes
and sensor nodes can ﬁgure out whether received localization
* Manuscript 1 
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informationshould be ﬁltered out in orderto ensure the validity
of the derived location, i.e., no extra cryptographic operations
are necessary. In addition to presenting the design of such a
robustness enhancement scheme, we also examine its perfor-
mance in terms of the detection probability of false localization
information for individual or collusive attackers, through both
bound analysis and simulation study. The results show that our
approach is viable for wireless sensor networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we brieﬂy introduce the localization algorithm that uses Ring-
Overlappingbased on Comparison of Received Signal Strength
Indicator (ROCRSSI) [12] and its enhancement with the secure
detectionmethod. InSectionIII, weanalyzethedetectionprob-
ability with different detection strategies. The performance of
the detection method is illustrated in Section IV. We review
the related work in Section V, and conclude the paper in Sec-
tion VI.
II. A SECURE RANGE-FREE SENSOR LOCALIZATION
SCHEME
A. Ring-Overlappingbased on Comparison of Received Signal
Strength Indicator (ROCRSSI)
In [12], the authors propose a range-free sensor localization
scheme that uses Ring-Overlapping based on Comparison of
Received Signal Strength Indicator (ROCRSSI). We use RO-
CRSSI as an example to illustrate how detection techniques
could be added into range-free localization to defend against
malicious attacks. We brieﬂy introduce ROCRSSI localization
in this section.
To calculate a position for sensor S, the ROCRSSI algorithm
generates a set of rings each containing S, computes the in-
tersection of the rings, and uses the center of gravity of the
intersection as the estimated position of S. Like other range-
free localization algorithms [7], ROCRSSI is based on several
assumptions:
1) There are two kinds of nodes: anchor nodes and sensor
nodes. The positions of the anchor nodes are known.
2) For a sensor node S and all anchor nodes that can
be heard by S, the Received Signal Strength Indicator
(RSSI) values between each pair of anchor nodes and be-
tween each anchornodeand S are knownto S via beacon
messages.
3) The signal strength at a node received from an anchor
node decreases monotonically as the distance increases1.
This assumption is called monotony constraint and is
used to obtain the relative spatial relationship between
anchors.
Assume that the received signal strength measured by node
Y for a signal transmitted from node X is denoted by γ(X,Y ).
Assume that the distance between two anchornodes A and B is
denoted by d(A,B). An example of ROCRSSI localization is
shown in Figure 1, where S is a sensor node and A,B,C,D,E
are anchor nodes. In Figure 1(a), S can calculate the ring cen-
tered at A with inner radius of d(A,B) and the outer radius
1This assumption is not always true in practice due to multipath channel
fading. The violation of this assumption is actually the main reason causing
estimation errors in range-free localization [7], [12]. The performance with
irregular radio propagation is presented in Section IV.
is d(A,C), if γ(A,B) > γ(A,S) > γ(A,C). With a fourth
anchor node, D, another ring centered at C as shown in Fig-
ure 1(b) can be computed, if γ(C,D) > γ(C,S) > γ(C,A).
Hence, S lies in the intersection of the two rings. Disks, as well
as rings, could be used to reduce the intersection area. For ex-
ample, as shown in Figure 1(c), if E is another anchor and if
γ(E,S) > γ(E,D), S can conclude that it falls within the disk
with center E and radius d(E,D). With more rings or disks,
the intersection area of the rings and disks becomes smaller and
smaller. Finally,S willusethecenterofthegravityofthesmall-
est intersection area as its location.
Note that in ROCRSSI only anchor nodes are required to
send beacon messages. A beacon message from anchor node A
will includethe location ofA and the signalstrengthreceivedat
A from its neighboring anchor nodes. By neighboring anchor
nodes of a node, we mean all anchor nodes whose beacon mes-
sages could be received by the node. A sensor node passively
receives the beacon messages, measures the RSSI values, and
derives possible rings and disks to estimate its location.
B. Secure Enhancement of ROCRSSI
The correct operation of ROCRSSI depends on correct RSSI
values claimed by a sensor’s neighboring anchor nodes. We
only consider malicious anchor nodes since a sensor node is
notrequiredto send outmessages in ROCRSSI localizationand
thus attacks on a sensor node have no impact on the localiza-
tion of other sensor nodes. Intuitively, a compromised anchor
node might fake arbitrary RSSI values or fake its own location
to fool sensor nodes to derive incorrect rings and disks. Esti-
mation based on incorrect rings and disks will generate wrong
location information. Furthermore, several malicious anchor
nodes may collude together to fake RSSI values and their loca-
tions, making the defense very challenging.
Suppose that a sensor node has a detection module, which
can verify the correctness of a claimed RSSI value or a claimed
location from an anchor node with certain probability. The sen-
sor node can make its decision whether or not to use the re-
ceived information based on the output of detection module. If
the detection module indicates that the claimed information is
faulty, the sensor node will simply ignore the information. The
sensor node uses the received information only if the informa-
tion does not contradict existing estimation. That is, with the
informationthe sensor node will not generate a ring or disk that
fall outside the existing intersection area, in which the sensor
node assumes itself to reside.
To make the abovesecure enhancementeffective, the follow-
ing questions must be answered: Without using cryptographic
operations, how can a sensor node verify the correctness of the
received information? How can the sensor node decide to ac-
cept or ignore a claimed RSSI value? What is the chance that
the fake information can be detected? We will answer these
questions in the following sections.
III. ANALYSIS OF DETECTION STRATEGIES
A. Attack Model
Inthis paper,we study a typicalattack onlocalization: theat-
tacker injects bogus information into the network to keep sen- 1 
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Fig. 1. An example of ROCRSSI: How S decides its location
sors from making correct location estimation. The bogus in-
formation could be injected into the network directly by one
attacker or could be injected by collusive attackers. Wormhole
attacks are one type of collusive attacks and have been inves-
tigated in [8]. Wormhole attacks, however, are not considered
in this paper due to the following two reasons. First, wormhole
attacks require several remotely separate attackers to collude
together to form a wormhole with certain methods (e.g., using
cables). We argue that wormhole attacks pose strong require-
ments on attackers and it may be hard to launch such attacks
in sensor networks. Second, wormhole attacks have been an-
alyzed in [8]. The detection algorithms presented in [8] can
be used directly to enhance ROCRSSI. Therefore, we focus
our discussion on the attack strategy that attackers do not form
wormhole but an attacker may broadcast any fake information
regardingits own location, or anyRSSI values it measures from
other anchor nodes. Such type of attack also allows collusive
attackers where attackers strategically decide the fake informa-
tion to mislead sensors.
In the sequel, we ﬁrst analyze the detection probability if an
attacker fakes its own location. We then introduce the methods
to detect an attacker faking RSSI values it measures from other
anchor nodes or faking both RSSI values and its own location.
B. Detection of Fake Location
If anchor node A fakes its own location, it can be detected as
an attacker with at least two strategies:
1) Strategy 1: A neighboring anchor node detects that its
distance to the fake location is larger than R, the maxi-
mum radio range.
2) Strategy 2: A neighboring sensor/anchor node detects
that the distance between anchor node A and another au-
dible anchor node is larger than 2R.
With the above strategies, a sensor node can only realize that
atleast oneofthe twoinvolvedanchornodescheatedbutcannot
tell exactly which one. The sensor node could adopt several
actions to avoid using fake information. For example, it could
simply ignore messages fromboth involvedanchors; or it could
waittosee ifotheranchorsorsensorsclaimthesamecheater; or
it could check more anchor pairs, if available, to decide who is
most likely to be cheating. We will present detailed operations
in Section III-D.
Next, we analyze the probability that anchor node A could
be detected as a cheater with the above strategies. Our analysis
reveals the lower bound on the detection probability since A
may be detected with other strategies. Later numerical results
show that A does not have much freedom to fake its location.
Assume that anchor node A is compromised and it tries to
hide its real location by claiming a fake location. Assume that
the maximum radio range of an anchor node is R. If the max-
imum radio ranges of different anchor nodes are different, we
use the largest value as R, and in this case, our analysis reveals
the lower bound of the probability that A can be detected as an
attacker. Assume that the distance between anchor node A’s
real location and the fake location is l(l ≥ 0). Without loss of
generality, we assume that the real location of A is (0,0) and
the fake location of A is (l,0). We assume the random deploy-
ment of network nodes that can be modeled as Poisson point
process. To make the model generic, we assume that the den-
sity of anchor nodes is λ1.
Remark 1: With detection strategy 1, the probability that an-
chor node A could be detected as a cheater, denoted as p1, is
p1 =
 
1 − e−λ1πR
2
if l ≥ 2R
1 − e−λ1f1(l) otherwise,
(1)
where
f1(l) = πR2 − 2R2 arccos
l
2R
+
l
2
 
4R2 − l2. (2)
Proof: With detection strategy 1, anchor node A can be
detected as long as there is at least one anchor node (e.g., B)
falling within the shadowed area as shown in Figure 2 (a),
where A and A′ represent the real location and the fake loca-
tion, respectively. Since the deployment of anchor nodes fol-
lows a spatial Poisson process in the ﬁeld, the probability that
A can be detected by at least one anchor node is:
p1 =
 
1 − e−λ1πR
2
if l ≥ 2R
1 − e−λ1f1(l) otherwise,
where f1(l) is the size of the shadowed area in Figure 2 (a)
and can be calculated with Equation (2). ￿
Remark 2: With detection strategy 2, the probability that an-
chor node A could be detected as a cheater is lower boundedby
a function of l.
Proof: Given a sensor node S = (
√
ρ,θ) in A’s radio range,
A is detected as a cheater with detection strategy 2 if there is at
least oneanchornode(e.g., C) fallingwithin theshadowedarea 1 
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Fig. 2. Detection strategies with maximum radio range
as shownin Figure2(b). Note that S with thepolarcoordinates
should be (
√
ρ,θ) instead of (ρ,θ) to guarantee the uniformity
of Poisson point process. The conditional probability can be
calculated as:
p2 = Pr{A can be detected by sensor S|S = (
√
ρ,θ)}
= 1 − e−λ1f2(l,ρ,θ),
(3)
where f2(l,ρ,θ) is the size of the shadowed area shown in
Figure 2 (b). Denote the distance between S and A′ as d, which
can be calculated as d =
 
l2 + ρ − 2l
√
ρcosθ. When d ≤ R,
f2(l,ρ,θ) = 0; otherwise (i.e., R < d ≤ 2R) ,
f2(l,ρ,θ) = 2 ∗ (
  d−2R
−R
 
R2 − x2dx
+
  d2−3R2
2d
d−2R
 
R2 − x2 −
 
4R2 − (x − d)2)dx.
(4)
Therefore, if we denote the set of A’s neighboring sensor
nodes as Ns,
p3 = Pr{A can be detected by sensor S | |Ns| = 1}
=
  R
0
  2π
0 p2dρdθ
  R
0
  2π
0 dρdθ
=
  R
0
  2π
0 p2dρdθ
2πR
.
(5)
Since A may have more neighboring sensors, Equation (5)
shows the lower bound of the detection probability by sensor
nodes. Exact calculation of detection probability with the sec-
ondstrategyis hardduetothe correlationonthe detectionprob-
abilities of multiple sensors. ￿
Next, we consider the cooperative detection of cheating an-
chor A. By cooperative detection, we mean that the cheating
anchor A is detected by either its neighboring anchors or its
neighboring sensors, and whenever a cheating behavior is de-
tected, an alarm will be raised.
Remark 3: With cooperative detection, the probability that
anchor node A could be detected as a cheater is also lower
bounded by a function of l.
Proof: DenoteE1 as the event that A is detectedby its neigh-
boring anchors. Denote E2 as the event that A is detected by
its neighboring sensors. The cooperative detection probability
is lower bounded by:
Pr{E1 ∪ E2} ≥ Pr{E1 ∪ E2 | |Ns| = 1} (6)
The inequality is based on the fact that E1 is independent of
Ns and Pr{E2} ≥ Pr{E2 | |Ns| = 1}. Pr{E1 ∪E2 | |Ns| =
1}is theprobabilitythat thereis at least oneanchornodefalling
within the shadowed area in Figure 2 (c) when l ≤ R or the
shadowed area in Figure 2 (d) when R < l ≤ 2R.
Based on Equations (2) and (4), we can calculate the size of
the shadowed area in Figure 2 (c) as the sum of f1 and f2 when
l ≤ R. Otherwise, we can calculate the size of the shadowed
area in Figure 2 (d) as the sum of f1 and f2 minus the over-
lapped area (the stroked area). We use f3 to denote its size.
Clearly, f3 is a function of l,ρ,θ.
Therefore Pr{E1 ∪E2 | S = (
√
ρ,θ)} can be calculated as:
p4 = Pr{E1 ∪ E2 | S = (
√
ρ,θ)}
=
 
1 − e−λ1(f1(l)+f2(l,ρ,θ)) if l ≤ R
1 − e−λ1(f1(l)+f2(l,ρ,θ)−f3(l,ρ,θ)) otherwise.
(7) 1 
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Hence,
Pr{E1 ∪ E2 | |Ns| = 1}
=
  R
0
  2π
0 p4dρdθ
2πR
(8)
Equation (8) shows the lower bound of cooperativedetection
probability. ￿
Theorem 1: If anchor node A fakes its own location, the
probability that it could be detected as a cheater is lowered
boundedby a monotonicallyincreasing function of l, where l is
the distance between the real location and the fake location of
A.
Its proof is a bit lengthy and is thus given in Appendix. The-
orem 1 is also veriﬁed by numerical calculation based on Equa-
tions (1)-(8). The numerical results in Figure 3 indicate that
the detection probability monotonically increases with the in-
crease of the ratio of l
R. The detection probability increases
very quickly for the cooperative detection strategy.
C. Detection of Fake RSSI Values
First, we observe that an attacker cannot arbitrarily change
the received signal strength values from other anchor nodes.
Forinstance, as shownin Figure1(a),anchornodeA shouldnot
fake γ(C,A) to a value larger than γ(C,B) since B is closer
to C than A. Otherwise, this fake information can be easily de-
tected. As such, we assume that the attacker is smart enough to
fakea RSSI valuethat doesnotviolateanymonotonyconstraint
described in Section II-A.
Under the monotony constraint, we observe that the effect of
faking a RSSI value is equivalent to moving the location of the
anchor node. For instance, increasing γ(C,A) is equivalent to
moving A closer to C as shown in Figure 1. This phenomenon
transforms the problem of detecting fake RSSI values to the
problem of detecting fake locations, which we have studied in
the previous section.
Surprisingly, a compromised anchor node causes no dam-
ages on ROCRSSI if it is truthful on its own location and only
fakes RSSI values under the monotony constraint. Like other
range-free localization algorithms, ROCRSSI does not use the
absolute RSSI values to estimate distance, but instead it com-
pares the RSSI values to estimate the relative spatial relation-
ship between anchors. As long as the monotony constraint is
not violated, the relative spatial relationship between anchors
will remain unchanged even if the attacker changes some RSSI
values.
As the conclusion, to detect fake RSSI values, we only need
to check if all messages sent from an anchor node meet the
monotony constraint. If not, the anchor node is assumed to be
an attacker. Otherwise, the messages could be used in localiza-
tion with no harm.
D. Detection of Both Fake Location and Fake RSSI Values
Based on previous discussion, we consider the situation that
an attacker may fake both location and RSSI information si-
multaneously. Our detection method will follow the following
steps:
1) Step 1: Any anchor node checks that if its distance from
another audible anchor node is larger than R, the maxi-
mum radio transmission range. An anchor node should
broadcast the information of the other neighboring an-
chor nodes that have a distance to it larger than R.
2) Step 2: Any anchor node checks the monotonyconstraint
once it receives messages from other anchor nodes. If
the constraint is violated, the anchor node should broad-
cast the information (i.e., the locations, the RSSI values)
regarding all anchor nodes involved2.
3) Step3: AsensornodecollectsallinformationfromStep1
andStep 2. In the meantime, it checks that if the distance
between two audible anchor nodes is larger than 2R and
records the anchor nodes that violate the constraint.
4) Step 4: A sensor node uses the above information to
improve its localization accuracy: It ﬁrst sorts the audi-
ble anchor nodes in the decreasing order of counts. The
counts of an audible anchor are the number of times that
it fails the tests in Steps 1, 2, and 3. By ignoring the ﬁrst
audible anchor in the list and all its associated informa-
tion, the sensor node checks the monotonyconstraint and
checks whether the distance between two audible anchor
nodes is larger than 2R. If the contradiction still exists,
the sensor node ignores the second audible anchor in the
list and repeats the same tests. Finally, the sensor node
only uses information that does not cause contradiction
in localization. Since the number of neighboring anchor
nodes is limited and every step one dubious anchor node
is removedfrom the list, the above operations will ﬁnally
converge when all contradicting claims are eliminated.
E. Collusive Attacks
The detection method introducedabovecan be used to detect
multiple independent malicious attackers. Nevertheless, when
2Collusive attackers may decide not to broadcast any information or broad-
cast fake information in Steps 1 and 2. Collusive attacks are discussed in the
next section. 1 
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several attackers collude together, they could fake their loca-
tionswithoutviolatingthegeometricandmonotonyconstraints.
For instance, all attackers could fake a location l meters away
from their real location along the same direction. The impact of
the collusive attack is equivalent to group movement,i.e., shift-
ing all nodes in same direction. Sensors will certainly create
wrong location estimations based on the fake group movement.
We do not think there exists an effective solution to defeat
such a collusive attack if more than half neighboring anchor
nodes of a sensor node are compromised. If the attackers are
independent or the number of the collusive attackers is small,
our detection method can remove the inconsistent information
andobtaina correctestimation. Theimpactofcollusiveattacks,
however, may not be totally eliminated, as demonstrated in the
later simulation results.
Collusive attackers may remain silent even if they detect the
violation in Steps 1 and 2 in the previous section. In this case,
as long as there exist good anchor nodes in the vicinity of the
attackers, the violation will be reported by good anchors. If a
sensor node’s neighboring anchors are all compromised and all
compromised anchors send out non-contradicting information,
there will be no effective solution as discussed above.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Model
We perform simulation to test the ROCRSSI localization al-
gorithm with security enhancement. We assume that 30 anchor
nodes are randomly deployed in a square area with each side of
100meters. Theradiorangeoftheanchornodesisthesameand
is set as 50 meters. Ten sensor nodes are randomly deployed in
the ﬁeld to estimate their locations. In the simulation, we as-
sume that some anchor nodes may be compromised and send
out fake information. The attacking anchor nodes are selected
randomlyamongthe 30 anchornodes. Thenumberof attacking
anchor nodes is a variable in the simulation.
We simulate both independent attacks and collusive attacks
described in Section III. We test the detection probability and
the average location estimation errors under different attacks.
The location estimation error of a sensor node is calculated as
the distance between its real location and its estimated location
in meters. We test the performancewith a perfect circular radio
model (Sections IV-B and IV-C) as well as with an irregular
radio propagation model (Section IV-D). For each simulation
scenario, 200 runs with different random seeds are executed
and the results are averaged.
B. Performance under Independent Attacks
Figure 4 shows the results of average location estimation
error under independent attacks. In the ﬁgure, l means the
distance between an attacking anchor’s fake location and its
true location and R means the maximum radio range of an-
chor nodes. It is generally true that more attackers may create
a larger average estimation error, but the difference caused by
different number of attackers is not signiﬁcant. In addition, a
large distance between an anchor node’s real location and its
fake location does not necessarily result in a large average lo-
cation estimation error. The phenomenon observed in Figure 4
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Fig. 5. Improvement of localization accuracy with security enhancement
(number of attacks = 10)
indicates that our detection method can effectivelylimit the im-
pact of attacking anchor nodes. We also tested the performance
without security enhancement. As shown in Figure 5, the aver-
age location error without security enhancement is about 20%
larger than that with security enhancement.
Figure 6 shows detection probability. It is clear that when
the fake location is far from the real location, over 70% at-
tacking anchor nodes can be correctly detected and the neg-
ative impact of the fake information can be removed. This
again demonstrates the advantages of our secure enhancement
scheme. Comparing Figure 6 and Figure 3, we can see that the
detection probabilities with our simulation is a bit larger than
the theoretical results. This is because our theoretical results
only reveal the lower bounds.
With the circular radio model, we did not observe any false
positive alarms (i.e., an honest node is detected as a cheating
node).
C. Performance under Collusive Attacks
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the performance of secure RO-
CRSSI under collusive attacks. The performance regarding the
average location estimation error and the ability of detecting at-
tackers is similar to that under independent attacks. The main
difference is that independent attacks tend to result in a large
variation in location estimation errors. This is because the im-
pact of the collusive attacks is similar to that of shifting all at-
tackers in the same direction, and the negative impact will be
consistently large or small, depending on the number of attack-
ers. It is clear from the simulation results that the negative im-
pact on location estimation error is trivial when the number of 1 
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Fig. 7. Average location estimation error under collusive attacks
attackers is small. We observe that under collusive attacks, the
average location error without security enhancement is about
30% larger than that with security enhancement.
D. Performance with Irregular Radio Model
We assumed a perfect circular radio propagation model in
the above tests. In this section, we present the performance
results with an irregular radio propagation model. It is com-
monlyknownthat radiopropagationexhibitsthefeatureofnon-
isotropic path losses [7], [12]. We adopt and extend the Degree
Of Irregularity (DOI) radio model [7]. In the DOI model, the
DOI value is deﬁned as the maximum range variation per unit
degree around the sender. Large DOI values represent large
variation of radio irregularity as shown in Figure 9 [7]. Unlike
the previousDOI model, we do not assume any lower boundon
radio irregularity. Our new model makes localization challeng-
ing but produces more realistic results [12].
In the extended model, the DOI value is still used to ad-
just the degree of radio irregularity. The signal strength is
C × K(θ)/d2 where C is a constant, d is the distance between
the receiverand the senderand is smaller than the maximumra-
dio rangeof the sender, and K(θ) is the coefﬁcient representing
the radio propagation feature in the speciﬁc direction θ. Thus
the radio irregularity is expressed by different K(θ) along dif-
ferent directions. For θ ∈ [0,360):
K(θ) =

 
 
1 θ = 0
K(θ − 1) + Rand × DOI θ is an integer
K(t) + (θ − s) × (K(t) − K(s)) Otherwise
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Fig. 9. The Degree of Irregularity (DOI) radio model
In the formula, Rand is a random number uniformly dis-
tributed between (−1,1), s = ⌊θ⌋, and t = ⌈θ⌉.
We only show the performance results under independentat-
tacks. The performance results under collusive attacks are sim-
ilar.
Figure 10 shows the localization errors with the extended ir-
regularradiomodel. We can see that thelocationestimationhas
largererrors than that with circular radio model. The results are
consistent with those observed in [7], [12]. The security en-
hancementcan still improvethe localization accuracy as shown
in Figure 11.
Figure 12 shows the attack detection probability. Compared
to Figure 6, we can see that the detection probability with ir-
regular radio model becomes lower than that with circular ra-
dio model. This is because the irregular radio model permits
smaller radio ranges in certain directions, and as such some
neighboring nodes may not receive the fake information.
An alarm is called false alarm when an honest node is de-
tected as a cheating node. The false alarm ratio is deﬁned as the
number of false alarms over the number of total alarms. While
the false alarm ratio is zero when the radio model is perfect cir-
cular model, we do observe false alarms when the radio model
becomes irregular. This is because irregular radio propagation
may violate the monotonyconstraints in Step 2 of our detection
method described in Section III-D. The false alarms are mainly
caused by radio irregularity and are insensitive to fake location
information. Nevertheless, the false alarm ratio is low as shown
in Figure 13.
E. Cost Analysis
In real implementation of range-free localization algorithms,
ananchornodeneedsto sendout severalroundsof beaconmes-
sages to let sensors obtain reliable RSSI values [12]. Because
of this, the security enhancement proposed in this paper does 1 
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Fig. 13. False alarm ratio under irregular radio model (DOI=0.15)
not require extra message transmissions since the information
fromanchor nodes (Steps 1 and 2 as describedin Section III-D)
can be piggybacked in the beacon messages.
The main cost for sensors is on the extra checks on the con-
tradictionin the receivedinformation. Assume that a sensor has
k neighboring anchor nodes, the number of extra comparisons
required is in the order of O(k
 k
2
 
) = O(k3) in the worst case.
This cost is very trivial for the sensor node since (1) k is the
number of the sensor node’s direct neighboring anchors which
is usually small and (2) the comparison does not require any
complex calculation.
V. RELATED WORK
Sensor localization [1], [7], [12]-[16], [18], [20] has become
an indispensablefunction for all applications over wireless sen-
sor networks. Despite the increasing security concerns, many
localization schemes are not designed to work under hostile en-
vironment and are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Security
in general is hard to provide in resource-constrained wireless
sensor networks and secure localization is especially challeng-
ing [17].
Recently, much work has been devoted to secure sensor lo-
calization. The solutions can be roughly categorized into two
types: the ones that rely on underlying cryptographic opera-
tions for message authentication and the ones that are based
on detection of abnormal behavior. The former ones include
SPINE [2], ROPE [10], ID-CODE [19], DRBTS [21], etc.
Many researchers [3][5] have studied the attack strategies and
thekeypre-distributionmethodsforsecurebroadcasting,which
maybe usefulin this typeof securelocalization. The latter ones
include the work in [4], [6], [8], [9], [11]. Our work also be-
longs to this category.
SPINE [2] is range-based localization scheme, and it pro-
vides secure computation and veriﬁcation of nodes location.
It is based on veriﬁable multilateration by bounding the dis-
tance. This is a centralized scheme and a large number of
reference points is required to obtain high accuracy in local-
ization. In [10], the authors propose a range-free localization
scheme, named ROPE (Robust Position Estimation). ROPE
contains two types of nodes: sensors and locators, and each
sensor shares a pairwise key with every locator. It is resilient
to the impact of jamming, wormhole attacks, and Sybil attacks.
In [19], the authors present a framework for providing robust
location estimation in emergency response systems, based on
irreducible identifying codes. The framework relies on the ID-
CODE algorithm, in which an identifying code is irreducible
if no codeword can be removed while still keeping every po-
sition uniquely identiﬁable. The ID-CODE algorithm may not
be practical in sensor networks due to its high computational
and storage overload. In [21], the authors propose a distributed
reputation and trust-based security protocol, called DRBTS. It
ignores the suspicious information from misbehaving nodes in
the calculation of locations.
In [5], the authors introducea localization anomaly detection
mechanism for wireless sensor networks, with the help of de-
ployment knowledge and group membership of neighbors. The
Probabilistic Location Veriﬁcation (PLV) algorithm [6] com-
pares a node’s Euclideandistance with the hop countof the ver- 1 
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iﬁcation packet. A small number of veriﬁer nodes are needed
to compute the locations of nodes and to determine the plausi-
bility of the location claims. In [11], the authors develop two
attack-resistant location estimation methods: attack-resistant
Minimum Mean Square Estimation (MMSE) and voting-based
location estimation. The ﬁrst one is to identify malicious loca-
tion references by estimating the mean square error and check-
ing the inconsistency of location references. The second one is
to divide the deployment ﬁeld into a grid of cells and has each
locationreferenceto voteon the cells in whichthe nodemayre-
side. SeRLoc [8] is a secure localization scheme against worm-
hole attacks and Sybil attacks. It assumes that common sensor
nodes are equipped with omnidirectional antennas and locators
are equipped with sectored antennas. HiRLoc [9] is another
range-free localization approach, in which sensor nodes pas-
sively determine their locations without any interaction among
themselves. Antenna orientation variation and communication
range variation are important properties for robustness. It is
similar to SeRLoc, but it improves the accuracy of SeRLoC by
using multiple beacons from the same locator.
Our work is close to SeRLoc [8] and HiRLoC [9], but we
adopt a different antenna model and address different types of
attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is an essential requirement for sensors to know their loca-
tions in wireless sensor networks. Malicious attacks may re-
sult in large localization errors, but unfortunately many sensor
localization algorithms do not consider the security issues in
their initial design. Only recently, research efforts are devoted
to the security of localization algorithms [3], [4], [10], [19]
and most of them depend on cryptographic operations and/or
complex authentication mechanisms. It is desirable to develop
lightweight security enhancement for localization that does not
rely on any cryptographic operations. In this paper, we make
such an attempt in this direction. We utilize the geometric con-
straints in sensor networks to detect contradicting information
from anchor nodes. Analytical results are derived and simu-
lation results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of
our secure enhancement scheme in a range-free localization al-
gorithm.
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on Remarks 1,2, and 3, the probability that an anchor
node, A, is detected as a cheater is lowered bounded by a func-
tion of l, the distance between the real location and the fake
location of A. The function is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of l due to the fact that the size of the shadowed area in
Figure 2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) monotonically increases with the
increase of l.
Case 1- Figure 2(a): The size of the shadowed area can be
calculated with Equation 2, which is clearly a monotonically
increasing function of l because
∂f1
∂l
=
p
4R2 − l2 > 0
when l < 2R. When l ≥ 2R, the shadowed area reached its
maximum, πR
2.
Case 2- Figure 2(b): The size of the shadowed area can be
calculated with Equation 4, which is, 1 
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10
f2 = 2 ∗ (
Z d−2R
−R
p
R2 − x2dx
+
Z d2−3R2
2d
d−2R
p
R2 − x2 −
p
4R2 − (x − d)2)dx
= 2 ∗ (
Z d2−3R2
2d
−R
p
R2 − x2dx −
Z d2−3R2
2d
d−2R
p
4R2 − (x − d)2dx)
= 2 ∗ (
Z d2−3R2
2d
−R
p
R2 − x2dx −
Z −d2−3R2
2d
−2R
p
4R2 − x2dx)
(9)
where d is the distance between S and A
′ and R < d ≤ 2R.
For given ρ and θ, f2 is a monotonicallyincreasing functionof l
because(1) d is a monotonicallyincreasingfunctionof l and(2)
f2 is a monotonically increasing function of d. The ﬁrst reason
is obvious since d =
p
(l −
√
ρcosθ)2 + ρsin2θ. The second
reason is true since
∂f2
∂d
= 2
p
−d4 + 10d2R2 − 9R4((
d
2 − 3R
2
2d
)
′ + (
d
2 + 3R
2
2d
)
′)
= 2
p
−d4 + 10d2R2 − 9R4
(10)
It is easy to see that
∂f2
∂d > 0 when R < d ≤ 2R, because
−d
4 + 10d
2R
2 − 9R
4 = (9R
2 − d
2)(d
2 − R
2) > 0.
Case 3 - Figure 2(c) (l ≤ R): The shadowed area is simply the
union of the shadowed areas of Case 1 and Case 2, and as such
the size ofthe shadowedareain Case 3 monotonicallyincreases
with the increase of l.
Case 4 - Figure 2(d) (R < l ≤ 2R): The shadowed area is the
union of the shadowed areas of Case 1 and Case 2 minus the
stroked area. Although the stroked area can be calculated nu-
merically in matlab, its exact mathematical expression is hard
to get. Nevertheless, that the size of the shadowed area in Fig-
ure 2(d) monotonicallyincreases with the increase of l is equiv-
alent to that the size of the shadowed area in Figure 14 mono-
tonically decreases with the increase of l.
The shadowed area in Figure 14 is the union of the starred
area and the stroked area. It is easy to see that the size of the
starred area monotonically decreases with the increase of l be-
cause its size equals πR
2 − f1, where f1 is the monotonically
increasing function of l in Case 1.
Next we prove that the stroked area in Figure 14 also mono-
tonically decreases with the increase of l. As shown in Fig-
ure 14, we use line SA
′ as the x-axis and S as the origin.
The y-axis is selected upward if S sits above line AA
′ and
downward otherwise. We denote points B,D, E, and A as
(Bx,By),(Dx,Dy), (Ex,Ey), and (Ax,Ay) respectively. Note
that Bx,By,Dx, and Dy all are a function of l, but Ex, Ey, Ax,
and Ay do not change with l. If we use d to denote the distance
between S and A
′ as before, d is also a function of l. The size
Fig. 14. Analysis on Cooperative Detection
of the stroked area, denoted as f4, can be calculated as:
f4 =
Z Dx
Bx
p
4R2 − (x − d)2dx −
Z Dx
Bx
(Ay +
p
R2 − (x − Ax)2)dx
+
Z Ex
Dx
p
R2 − x2dx −
Z Ex
Dx
(Ay +
p
R2 − (x − Ax)2dx
=
Z Dx−d
Bx−d
p
4R2 − x2dx +
Z Ex
Dx
p
R2 − x2dx
−
Z Ex
Bx
(Ay +
p
R2 − (x − Ax)2)dx
(11)
Therefore,
∂f4
∂l
= Dy(Dx − d)
′ − By(Bx − d)
′ − DyD
′
x + ByB
′
x
= Byd
′ − Dyd
′
= (By − Dy)
l −
√
ρcosθ
p
l2 + ρ − 2l
√
ρcosθ
(12)
Note that in Case 4, R < l ≤ 2R and
√
ρcosθ ≤ R (S must
be able to hear A). Thus
l−
√
ρ cos θ √
l2+ρ−2l
√
ρ cos θ > 0. Due to the
way that we set the direction of y-axis, By < Dy. Therefore
∂f4
∂l < 0, which means, the size of the stroked area in Figure 14
monotonically decreases with the increase of l. ￿